Do modified audit opinions have economic consequences? Empirical evidence based on financial constraints  by Lin, Zhiwei et al.
China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
China Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarDo modiﬁed audit opinions have economic consequences? Empirical
evidence based on ﬁnancial constraintsq
Zhiwei Lin a,⇑, Yihong Jiang a, Yixuan Xu b
a School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
b School of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, China
a r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 23 April 2010
Accepted 26 April 2011
Available online 27 August 2011
JEL classiﬁcation:
M42
G32
L14
Keywords:
Modiﬁed audit opinions (MAOs)
Economic consequences
Financial constraints
Earnings management
Government intervention
Political connections1755-3091/$ - see front matter  2011 China Jour
Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights re
doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2011.06.004
q This paper was supported by the National Natu
Humanities and Social Science of the Ministry of E
anonymous referee, Ge Rui and participants at CJAR
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 13020284818.
E-mail address: szstanly@gmail.com (Z. Lin).
1 Modiﬁed audit opinions (MAOs) include opinionsa b s t r a c t
We present a framework and empirical evidence to explain why, on average, 11% of listed
ﬁrms in China received modiﬁed audit opinions (MAOs) between 1992 and 2009. We argue
that there are two reasons for this phenomenon: strong earnings management incentives
lower ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reporting quality and soft budget constraints weaken the information
and governance roles of audit opinions. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints eased after
receiving MAOs, which suggests that MAOs have limited economic consequences. Further
analysis shows that this phenomenon predominantly exists in government-controlled
ﬁrms and ﬁrms that receive MAOs for the ﬁrst time. We also ﬁnd that MAOs have not inﬂu-
enced ﬁnancial constraints after 2006. Finally, we ﬁnd that MAOs did not affect borrowing
cash ﬂows from banks until 2005, suggesting that MAOs did not start affecting bank ﬁnanc-
ing until that year. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms receive more related-party ﬁnancing after
receiving MAOs. Our results indicate that a limited effect on bank ﬁnancing and increased
related-party ﬁnancing reduce the effect of MAOs on ﬁnancial constraints.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
On average, 11% of the annual reports of Chinese listed ﬁrms received modiﬁed audit opinions (MAOs) between 1992 and
2009, which is much higher than in Britain (2.96%) and other East Asian economies (2.01%).1 We provide a framework and
empirical evidence to explain this phenomenon.nal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
ral Science Foundation of China (No. 71172143), and the Major Project of Key Research Institute of
ducation, People’s Republic of China (No. 2009JJD790030). We appreciate helpful comments from an
Summer Research Workshop (2010, Hong Kong, China). All errors are our own.
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nual reports, the competency of auditors and the independence of auditors. The ﬁrst factor is mainly determined by the
incentives of listed companies and the last two factors represent audit quality. The extant literature uses the proportion
of ﬁrms that received MAOs to proxy for audit quality in China. They argue that an increase in audit risk leads to higher audi-
tor independence and audit quality, which results in an increase in the proportion of ﬁrms that receive MAOs (DeFond et al.,
2000; Wang and Chen, 2001). Although audit quality is important in determining the likelihood of receiving a MAO, a more
important determinant is the probability of substantial misrepresentation in annual reports, which is overlooked in the ex-
tant literature.2 We examine the economic consequences of receiving a MAO and explain why ﬁrms in China have a high occur-
rence of misrepresentation in annual reports.
We argue that the main reasons for the high proportion of MAOs in China are strong earnings management incentives and
the limited costs of receiving MAOs. First, a substantial amount of research ﬁnds that security regulations (IPO, SEO and
delisting regulations, etc.), related-party tunneling and corporate rent-seeking activities provide listed companies with
strong incentives to engage in earnings management, which increases the probability of substantial misrepresentation in an-
nual reports (Jiang, 1998; Lu, 1999; Sun and Wang, 1999; Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Fan and Wong, 2002;
Liu and He, 2004; Li et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2008a,b; Luo and Zhen, 2008). Second, ﬁrms’ investment and ﬁnancing opportu-
nities are mainly determined by political connections and government intervention (Sun et al., 2005; Xia and Fang, 2005; Luo
and Tang, 2007; Fan et al., 2008b; Li et al., 2008; Luo and Zhen, 2008; Luo and Liu, 2009) and not by information asymmetry
signaled by MAOs. Thus, receiving a MAO does not necessarily have a large negative effect on ﬁrm value. In summary, strong
earnings management incentives increase the probability of substantial misrepresentation in annual reports, which results
in more modiﬁed audit opinions. Also, because MAOs have little effect on investment and ﬁnancing opportunities, ﬁrms
choose to accept a high probability of receiving a MAO after considering the costs and beneﬁts.
We focus on the effect of receiving MAOs on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints for two reasons. First, China is an emerging mar-
ket in which ﬁrms have good investment opportunities. However, the capital market is still developing and capital is a scarce
resource in China (Lin et al., 1999). We can learn what role accounting information plays in the process of value creation by
examining the effect of MAOs on ﬁnancial constraints, which affect ﬁrm investment and ﬁnancing activities. Second, we can
learn about one of the real effects of accounting information by studying the effect of MAOs on ﬁnancial constraints.3
There are two competing views on the effect of MAOs on ﬁnancial constraints. The ﬁrst is the Information Asymmetry
View (IAV). The audit report conveys important information about the information quality of annual reports; receiving a
MAO signals a decrease in information quality and an increase in information asymmetry between ﬁrm insiders and outsid-
ers, which increases ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints. However, there is another possibility. In China, ﬁrms obtain outside ﬁnanc-
ing through help from the government, by using political connections or by building their internal capital market to mitigate
the difﬁculty in obtaining ﬁnancing from outside sources. To avoid securities regulations or conceal the tunneling or rent-
seeking activities of controlling shareholders, ﬁrms with relatively poor performance have strong incentives to manipulate
earnings, which increase the chance of receiving MAOs. However, to help ﬁrms boost performance, governments and con-
trolling shareholders have incentives to help ﬁrms acquire more ﬁnancing, which can soften budget constraints and ease
ﬁnancing constraints. We call this the Soft Budget Constraint View (SCV). These two mechanisms may coexist and if the ef-
fect of SCV is larger than the effect of IAV, then ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints may remain unchanged or even ease after receiv-
ing MAOs. Thus, MAOs do not necessarily create substantial negative effects on ﬁrms’ investment and ﬁnancing activities,
which could explain the high proportion of ﬁrms that receive MAOs in China.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints ease after receiving MAOs, which means the effect of soft budget constraints is
larger than the effect of information asymmetry. Further analysis shows that this phenomenon predominantly exists in gov-
ernment-controlled ﬁrms and ﬁrms that receive MAOs for the ﬁrst time. We also ﬁnd that MAOs do not inﬂuence ﬁnancial
constraints after 2006. Finally, we ﬁnd that MAOs did not affect borrowing cash ﬂows from banks before 2005, which means
that MAOs did not start affecting bank ﬁnancing until that year. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms obtain more related-party ﬁnancing
after receiving MAOs. Our results show that a limited effect on bank ﬁnancing and increased related-party ﬁnancing reduce
the effect of MAOs on ﬁnancial constraints.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, the extant literature explains the probability of receiving MAOs from the per-
spective of auditor independence. We argue that this is an incomplete view and provide a comprehensive framework to fur-
ther our understanding of China’s audit market based on the country’s special institutional factors. This framework
represents a speciﬁc development in research on the effect of institutions on accounting information (Ball et al., 2000; Ball,
2001). Second, we explain why MAOs have limited information and corporate governance roles from the perspectives of2 For example, if there is little misrepresentation in annual reports, then the observed proportion of ﬁrms that receive MAOs is near zero even if auditors are
fully independent. However, if the probability of substantial misrepresentation increases, then the observed proportion of ﬁrms that receive MAOs will increase
even if auditor independence remains unchanged.
3 Receiving a MAO has many economic consequences, including the effect on ﬁrm liquidity, the cost of capital, management turnover, etc. These are possible
future research questions that could help us further understand the economic consequences of receiving MAOs. We do not examine the effect of receiving
MAOs on the cost of capital for two reasons. First, we need stock prices to calculate the cost of capital. However, price is an expectation measure and the market
may anticipate the possibility of receiving MAOs and adjust the stock price in advance, which makes it difﬁcult to identify the effect of MAOs on the cost of
capital. Second, the stock market in China is not very efﬁcient and the information content of price is low (Morck et al., 2000), which causes large estimation
errors when using prices to calculate cost of capital measures.
Table 1
Modiﬁed audit opinions in China’s stock market.
Year Listed
companies
Number that received
audit opinions
Number that received
MAOs
Proportion that
received MAOs (%)
Panel A: Proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs in China’s stock market
1992 50 45 2 4.4
1993 179 154 5 3.2
1994 291 269 6 2.2
1995 321 321 36 11.2
1996 531 529 46 8.7
1997 745 745 90 12.1
1998 852 851 147 17.3
1999 949 948 189 19.9
2000 1091 1091 178 16.3
2001 1164 1163 156 13.4
2002 1228 1228 165 13.4
2003 1293 1293 109 8.4
2004 1380 1380 151 10.9
2005 1375 1375 171 12.4
2006 1458 1458 150 10.3
2007 1572 1572 125 8.0
2008 1626 1626 113 6.9
2009 1774 1774 118 6.7
PRC 17879 17822 1957 11.0
UK 5441 161 2.96
8 East Asian economies 2834 57 2.01
Number of MAOs
received
Number
of ﬁrms
Number of
MAOs received
Number
of ﬁrms
Number of
MAOs received
Number
of ﬁrms
Total
Panel B: Statistics for the number of ﬁrms that received MAOs
1 193 6 31 11 1
2 134 7 20 12 2
3 89 8 16 13 1
4 63 9 16 16 1
5 45 10 9
Total 524 92 5 621
(1) Chinese sample includes A share and B share ﬁrms; all Chinese data comes from the CSMAR database and was compiled by the authors.
(2) The UK data comes from Lennox (2000), including 949 listed companies from 1988 to 1994.
(3) The data on Eight East Asian economies comes from Fan and Wong (2005), including listed companies from 1994 to 1996.
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information in allocating resources and in designing regulations that are more effective.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the phenomenon whereby a large proportion of ﬁrms
in China receive MAOs, provides a simple framework to explain this phenomenon and develops our hypotheses. Section 3
presents the research design, which describes the sample and the research models and deﬁnes the variables. Section 4 pre-
sents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the article.2. Research question, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis
2.1. Research question
Table 1, Panel A reports the number of ﬁrms in the Chinese stock market that received MAOs between 1992 and 2009. We
ﬁnd the proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs has been above 7% since 1995, reaching a peak of 19.9% in 1999.4 On average,
11% of ﬁrms received MAOs in China from 1992 to 2009. We estimate that even after dropping unavoidable MAOs, the propor-
tion of ﬁrms that received avoidable MAOs was 7.7%.5
According to Lennox (2000), the proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs in Britain between 1988 and 1994 was 2.96%,
which is eight percent lower than in China. Fan and Wong (2005) report the proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs in eight
East Asian economies from 1994 to 1996 was 2.01%, which is almost nine percent lower than in China. The proportion of
ﬁrms that received MAOs in China is clearly much higher than in markets in developed countries (such as Britain) and in
developing countries (eight East Asian countries). The proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs cannot be compared due to4 The proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs in 2003 decreased from 13.4% to 8.4%, which is explained by changes in audit standards (Wang and Tu, 2006).
5 We do not have data on unavoidable MAOs, but, in line with Chen et al. (2005), we believe this percentage would not exceed 30% of MAOs; thus, the
percentage of avoidable MAOs is 7.7 % (11% ⁄ 0.7 = 7.7%).
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quality of listed companies and the level of investor protection. Nevertheless, it is notable that although we share a similar
investor protection environment and culture, a much higher proportion of ﬁrms received MAOs in China than in other East
Asian economies.
Table 1, Panel B summarizes the number of ﬁrms that received MAOs from 1992 to 2009. It shows that 621 ﬁrms received
MAOs during this period. This includes 428 ﬁrms that received two or more MAOs, 92 ﬁrms received between 6 and 10, and 5
ﬁrms received more than 10. The ﬁrm that received the most was SHENRUN GUFENG (Chen et al., 2009), which received 18
MAOs from 1993 to 2010. Given these statistics, it is reasonable to ask why so many ﬁrms received MAOs in China during
this period.
2.2. Theoretical analysis
Eq. (1) shows that the probability of receiving MAOs is the joint probability of three factors. The ﬁrst is the likelihood that
there is substantial misrepresentation in annual reports. The second is the probability that auditors (A) ﬁnd substantial mis-
representation in annual reports, conditional on there being substantial misrepresentation in annual reports. The third is the
probability that auditors report substantial misrepresentation, conditional on them ﬁnding it. The second and third factors
are called professional competence and auditor independence, and represent audit quality (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).Pðreceive MAOsÞ ¼ PðSubstantial misrepresentation in annual reportsÞ
 PðAuditors find the substantial misrepresentation Substantial misrepresentation in annual reportsÞ
 PðAuditors report the substantial misrepresentation Auditors find the substantial misrepresentationÞ ð1ÞAccording to Eq. (1), we can explain the high proportion of ﬁrms that receive MAOs in China from two perspectives. The ﬁrst
explanation looks at the problem from the perspective of audit quality and assumes that improved audit quality increases
the proportion of ﬁrms that receive MAOs. DeFond et al. (2000) and Wang and Chen (2001) take the proportion of ﬁrms that
received MAOs as a proxy variable for auditor independence. They ﬁnd that the introduction of new audit standards in 1995
and the disafﬁliation program in 1997 improved auditor independence, which is proxied by increases in the proportion of
ﬁrms that received MAOs. Improvement in auditor independence could explain the time-series increase in the proportion
of ﬁrms that received MAOs, but cannot explain why the proportion is much higher than in European and Asian countries,
because there is no evidence that professional competence and auditor independence is better in China than elsewhere.
Thus, the explanation for the high proportion of ﬁrms receiving MAOs in China must lie in why there is a high probability
of substantial misrepresentation.
We believe that strong earnings management incentives and the limited costs of receiving MAOs are the fundamental
reasons why ﬁrms do not adjust annual reports according to auditors’ suggestions, and this is why a high proportion of ﬁrms
receive MAOs.
2.2.1. Strong earnings management incentives
Firms have incentives to manipulate earnings to obtain equity ﬁnancing opportunities or avoid delisting regulation. First,
ﬁrms may engage in ﬁnancial packaging to raise more equity in the IPO process. The ﬁndings of Aharony et al. (2000) and Lin
and Wei (2000) conﬁrm that ﬁrms engage in earnings management in IPOs. Second, in 1996, the CSRC required ﬁrms that
apply for SEOs to have ROE of at least 10% for three consecutive years. Haw et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the number of ﬁrms whose
ROE lies between 10% and 11% is three times higher in the period from 1996 to 1998 than from 1994 to 1995. Chen and Yuan
(2004) examine the earnings quality of ﬁrms that applied for SEOs from 1996 to 1998. They ﬁnd that applying ﬁrms have
more non-operating income and investment income if their ROE is less than 10%. However, although regulators lower the
probability of SEOs for these ﬁrms, some are given permission to issue new shares. Finally, to avoid intervention from reg-
ulators following two consecutive years of losses, ﬁrms have strong incentives to manipulate earnings. Sun andWang (1999)
and Wang et al. (2005) ﬁnd some empirical evidence to support such a hypothesis.
Firms may manipulate earnings to conceal the tunneling activities or rent-seeking activities of controlling shareholders
(Fan and Wong, 2002). Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) use 130 Indonesian listed companies as their research sample and
examine whether political connections have an effect on ﬁrms’ overseas ﬁnancing decisions and disclosure policies. They
ﬁnd that ﬁrms that had intimate connections with Suharto had little incentive to list overseas before the ﬁnancial crisis,
but this changed after Suharto stepped down. This suggests that ﬁrms that have political connections do not have incentives
to improve disclosure quality. Plenty of research on the Chinese market ﬁnds it is common practice for controlling sharehold-
ers to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and engage in rent-seeking activities (Li et al., 2004, 2006; Yue, 2006;
He et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2009). Firms have an incentive to manipulate earnings to hide such behavior to avoid media
pressure or litigation risk.
2.2.2. Limited economic consequences of receiving MAOs
Many researchers ﬁnd that SOEs have soft budget constraints (La Porta et al., 2002; Lin and Li, 2004). Sun et al. (2006) ﬁnd
that state-controlled ﬁrms have implicit guarantees from local governments and can obtain more loans from banks. Liao
(2007) ﬁnds that accounting information reduces information asymmetry in banks’ lending decisions, but this relationship
Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154 139disappears when ﬁrms are state controlled. Lu et al. (2008) ﬁnd that new long-term debt is uncorrelated with accounting
information quality, which implies that accounting information does not play an important role in banks’ lending decisions.
Thus, even if MAOs imply poor accounting information and greater information asymmetry, this may have little effect on
ﬁrms’ debt-raising ability under China’s special institutional environment.
In countries or regions with weak property rights protection, ﬁrms have incentives to build political connections to secure
better protection from government (Li et al., 2008), to gain more loans from banks and more subsidies from the government
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2008b). Firms with political connections can obtain more
economic aid from the government when they get into ﬁnancial distress (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006). Political
connections therefore play a vital role in determining ﬁrms’ investment and ﬁnancing opportunities. Yu and Pan (2008) ﬁnds
that ﬁrms with political connections obtain more bank loans and have a longer debt maturity structure. Wu et al. (2008)
report similar results and ﬁnd that the role of political connections is more important in areas with more government inter-
vention. Luo and Zhen (2008) examine the role of political connections in privately controlled listed ﬁrms and ﬁnd that pri-
vately controlled ﬁrms with political connections have fewer ﬁnancial constraints and this relationship is stronger in areas
with a low level of ﬁnancial development. In summary, political connections provide privately controlled ﬁrms with more
investment opportunities and more favorable ﬁnancing conditions. Thus, for ﬁrms with political connections, the role of
accounting information quality will diminish or have less inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ investment and ﬁnancing opportunities.2.3. Hypotheses
The role of an auditor is to issue an opinion on whether a ﬁrm’s annual reports fairly represent its ﬁnancial position, oper-
ating results and cash ﬂows in all material respects. Auditors issue a MAO if they ﬁnd there is substantial misrepresentation
in a ﬁrm’s annual report. Receiving a MAO therefore reﬂects deterioration in accounting information quality or an increase in
information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders. Low accounting information quality will increase investors’ estima-
tion risk and agency costs, and investors will then ask for higher returns to compensate for the increased risks and costs
(Francis et al., 2005; Lambert et al., 2007; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). The higher the outside ﬁnancing costs, the larger the
ﬁnancial constraints a ﬁrm may face (Fazzari et al., 1988). According to this theory, we expect that MAOs will increase ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial constraints. We call this hypothesis the ‘‘Information Asymmetry View’’ (IAV).
Firms manipulate earnings to meet equity-ﬁnancing requirements or avoid delisting regulations, or to conceal the tun-
neling or rent-seeking activities of controlling shareholders, which result in a higher probability of substantial misrepresen-
tation in annual reports. Firms receive MAOs if they refuse to adjust their annual reports according to the auditor’s
suggestions. However, ﬁrms can continue to obtain bank loans even with low quality accounting information because of gov-
ernment intervention or political connections. If receiving a MAO does reduce the probability of equity ﬁnancing and bank
loans, then controlling shareholders will help the ﬁrm to get through difﬁcult times (Li et al., 2005), and one way of doing so
is to provide related-party loans. Therefore, receiving a MAO may result in a soft budget constraint that eases a ﬁrm’s ﬁnan-
cial constraints. We call this hypothesis the ‘‘Soft Budget Constraint View’’ (SCV).
In sum, there are two possibilities after receiving MAOs. On the one hand, receiving MAOs means more information asym-
metry, which results in increased ﬁnancial constraints. On the other hand, the ﬁnancial constraints of ﬁrms may decrease
after receiving MAOs if they receive more subsidies from the government or assistance from controlling shareholders. If
the soft budget constraint effect is larger than the information asymmetry effect, then the net effect of receiving MAOs is
a decrease in ﬁnancial constraints.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
The initial sample of this paper is all A-share companies listed between 1998 and 2006. We need information on cash
ﬂows to carry out ﬁnancial constraints tests, but this information was not disclosed in annual reports until 1998. All listed
companies adopted the new accounting standards after the completion of the tradable share reform in 2007. Therefore, we
choose 1998 as the initial year and 2006 as the ﬁnal year of the sample in this paper.
In the initial sample, we delete ﬁnancial industry ﬁrms and ﬁrms that either have negative ﬁxed assets at the end of year
or have missing data. Then, in the ﬁnal sample, the number of observations per year is 575, 743, 839, 1003, 1077, 1159, 1231,
1309 and 1313 from 1998 to 2006, and the full sample contains 9249 ﬁrm-year observations.
To investigate whether the effect of MAOs on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints differ signiﬁcantly over different time periods,
we use the same data collection procedures to create two more samples, one with 695 observations spanning 1995–1997
and the other with 4456 observations spanning 2007–2009.
The data for ‘‘net cash ﬂow from operating activities’’ and ‘‘purchases of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-
term assets’’ cannot be obtained directly from the statement of cash ﬂows before 1998. We use the difference between
net proﬁt and total accruals as the estimated value of the ‘‘net cash ﬂow from operating activities,’’ and the annual change
in the balance of ﬁxed assets as the estimated value of ‘‘purchases of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term
assets.’’
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from the CCER database and supplemented with hand-collected data. We winsorize the top and bottom 1% of values for all
continuous variables to mitigate the effect of extreme values on our empirical analysis.3.2. Research model and variable deﬁnitions
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Bernanke and Gertler (1990) point out that information asymmetry and agency costs may
cause external ﬁnancing costs to be higher than internal ﬁnancing costs. The difference between external and internal
ﬁnancing costs represents the ﬁnancing constraints of the enterprise. Fazzari et al. (1988) demonstrate that ﬁnancing con-
straints cause a positive relationship between corporate investment and internal generated cash ﬂows, and the greater the
ﬁnancial constraints are, the stronger the positive relationship.
On the one hand, if receiving a MAO conveys more information asymmetry and agency costs between the ﬁrm and other
contract parties, then the ﬁnancial constraints of the enterprise will increase. On the other hand, a MAOmay indicate that the
ﬁrm will receive more support from the government or controlling shareholders, which will lead to the soft budget con-
straint problem and thus reduce ﬁnancing constraints.
Following Zhu et al. (2006) and Luo and Zhen (2008), we use model (2) to test whether receiving MAOs affects the sen-
sitivity of investment expenditure to cash ﬂows from operating activities:INVSTit ¼ b0 þ b1OCFit þ b2MAOit1 þ b3MAOit1  OCFit þ b4PRIVit þ b5PRIVit  OCFit þ b6GROWTHit þ b7SIZEit
þ FixedEffectsþ eit ð2ÞWe use model (3) to test whether different types of MAOs affect the sensitivity of investment expenditure to cash ﬂows from
operating activities:INVSTit ¼ b0 þ b1OCFit þ b2UQAO EXPLANit1 þ b3QUAOit1 þ b4DISC ADVSit1 þ b5UQAO EXPLANit1  OCFit
þ b6QUAOit1  OCFit þ b7DISC ADVSit1  OCFit þ b8PRIVit þ b9PRIVit  OCFit þ b10GROWTHit
þ b11SIZEit þ FixedEffectsþ eit ð3ÞMAOit1 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if last year’s audit opinion is modiﬁed, and 0 otherwise. We also divide MAOs
into three categories. UQAO_EXPLANit1 is an unqualiﬁed opinion with explanatory paragraphs, which equals 1 if a ﬁrm re-
ceived this opinion last year and 0 otherwise. UQAOit1 is a qualiﬁed opinion, which equals 1 if a ﬁrm received this opinion
last year and 0 otherwise. DISC_ADVSit1 is other modiﬁed opinions, which equals 1 if a ﬁrm received a disclaimed opinion or
adverse opinion last year and 0 otherwise.
We deﬁne two variables based on whether ﬁrms received MAOs for the ﬁrst time. MAO_FTit1is ‘‘receiving a MAO for the
ﬁrst time,’’ which equals 1 if ﬁrms received a MAO for the ﬁrst time last year and 0 otherwise; andMAO_FTit1 is ‘‘receiving a
MAO not for the ﬁrst time,’’ which equals 1 if ﬁrms received a MAO last year but it was not the ﬁrst time they had received
one since their IPO, and 0 otherwise.
INVSTit is investment expenditure, which is measured as annual ‘‘purchases of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other
longterm assets’’ from the statement of cash ﬂows, divided by this year’s beginning balance of ﬁxed assets. OCFit is net cash
ﬂows generated from operating activities, which equals annual ‘‘net cash ﬂows from operating activities’’ divided by this
year’s beginning balance of ﬁxed assets. PRIVit is the type of ultimate controller, which equals 1 for non-government agencies
or individuals and 0 otherwise; GROWTHit is growth opportunities, measured by annual revenue growth rate; SIZEit is ﬁrm
size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at year end. All the variables used in this article are deﬁned in
Table 2.
Compared with ﬁrms that received a standard unqualiﬁed opinion, the IAV means that information becomes more asym-
metrical when the company receives a MAO, which will increase ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints. In other words, the positive
correlation between investment expenditure and cash ﬂows from operating activities will be strengthened, in which case
the coefﬁcient (b3) on the interaction term (MAOit1  OCFit) in model (2) should be signiﬁcantly positive. The ‘‘Soft Budget
Constraint View’’ argues that companies that receive MAOs are more likely to receive government subsidies, obtain bank
loans or be propped up by controlling shareholders. This view implies that the correlation between investment expenditure
and net cash ﬂows from operating activities may remain unchanged or even become signiﬁcantly negative after ﬁrms receive
MAOs, in which case the coefﬁcient (b3) on MAOit1  OCFit in model (2) should be zero or negative.3.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
The descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in this paper are presented in Table 3. The sample period is from
1998 to 2006, and the sample thus includes 9249 ﬁrm-year observations. In this sample, 12.2% of the ﬁrms received MAOs,
of which 7.2% received an unqualiﬁed opinion with explanatory paragraphs, 3.8% a qualiﬁed opinion and 1.2% a disclaimed
opinion or adverse opinion. Of those ﬁrm-year observations that received a MAO, 36% received a MAO for the ﬁrst time and
the other 64% not for the ﬁrst time. In addition, the descriptive statistics show that 22.9% of ﬁrm-year observations have
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Variable name Deﬁnition
ICFit Investment expenditure Cash payments to acquire ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets divided by
the yearly beginning balance of ﬁxed assets; the pre-1988 data uses the change in book value of
ﬁxed assets
NICFit Net investment expenditure The net cash ﬂow of the cash payment to acquire ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-
term assets, minus the cash inﬂow of disposing of the aforementioned assets, divided by the
yearly beginning balance of ﬁxed assets
MAOit1 Modiﬁed audit opinions Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received a MAO last year, and 0 otherwise
UQAO_EXPLANit1 Unqualiﬁed opinion with
explanatory paragraph
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received an unqualiﬁed opinion with explanatory
paragraph last year, and 0 otherwise
QUAOit1 Qualiﬁed opinion Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received a qualiﬁed opinion last year, and 0
otherwise
DISC_ADVSit1 Disclaimed and adverse
opinions
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received a disclaimed or adverse opinion last year,
and 0 otherwise
MAO_FTit1 First time MAOs Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received a modiﬁed opinion last year and it was the
ﬁrst time since the IPO, and 0 otherwise
MAO_NFTit1 Not ﬁrst time MAOs Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received a modiﬁed opinion last year and it was not
the ﬁrst time since the IPO, and 0 otherwise
OCFit Net cash ﬂows from operating
activities
Annual net cash ﬂows from operating activities divided by the yearly beginning balance of ﬁxed
assets. The difference between net proﬁt and total accrual is used as a proxy for data before 1998
PRIVit Ultimate controller Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the type of ultimate controller is a non-government agency
or individual, and 0 otherwise
ROAit Return on assets ROA equals net income minus ﬁnancial expenses divided by year-end total assets
GROWTHit Growth rate Annual revenue growth rate
TQit Growth opportunities TOBINQ = the sum of the market value of equity and net debt divided by year-end total assets, in
which the market value of non-tradable equity is measured as net assets
LEVit Leverage Ratio of debt to total year-end assets
SIZEit Size The natural logarithm of the total year-end assets
INDit Industry dummies There are 21 industries in our sample after deleting the ﬁnancial industry. We generate 20
industry dummy variables
YEARit Year dummies Controls for the effect of macroeconomic conditions. There are 9 years of data, so we generate 8
dummy variables
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Median SD Min P5 P95 Max
ICF 9249 0.336 0.167 0.537 0.0004 0.007 1.233 3.896
NICF 7729 0.301 0.152 0.495 0.314 0.005 1.133 3.649
MAO 9249 0.122 0 0.327 0 0 1 1
UQAO_EXPLAN 9249 0.072 0 0.258 0 0 1 1
QUAO 9249 0.038 0 0.191 0 0 0 1
DISC_ADVS 9249 0.012 0 0.108 0 0 0 1
MAO_FT 9249 0.044 0 0.206 0 0 0 1
MAO_NFT 9249 0.077 0 0.267 0 0 1 1
PRIV 9249 0.229 0 0.420 0 0 1 1
OCF 9249 0.197 0.165 1.251 7.920 0.621 1.173 8.292
ROA 9249 0.039 0.049 0.086 0.400 0.117 0.135 0.256
GROWTH 9249 0.214 0.134 0.564 0.847 0.406 0.984 3.807
TQ 9249 1.370 1.208 0.544 0.806 0.896 2.369 5.755
LEV 9249 0.500 0.485 0.253 0.074 0.163 0.825 1.990
SIZE 9249 21.095 21.013 0.949 18.783 19.652 22.758 24.407
Note: To mitigate the effects of extreme values on our empirical analysis, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% value of all continuous variables. Deﬁnitions
and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
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growth rate is 21.4% and the average debt to assets ratio is 50%.
In Table 4 we present the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients for all the variables, in which ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote a correlation
between the two variables is signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The correlation results show that the ulti-
mate controllers of ﬁrms that receive MAOs are more likely to be non-government agencies or individuals. In addition, the
ﬁrms that received MAOs have lower proﬁtability, lower growth rates, higher debt to assets ratios and smaller size. Finally,
ﬁrms that received MAOs cut the amount of investment expenditure in the following year.
Table 4
Correlations.
ICF NICF MAO UQAO_EXPLAN QUAO DISC_ADVS MAO_FT MAO_NFT OCF PRIV ROA GROWTH TQ LEV
NICF 0.979⁄⁄⁄
MAO 0.119⁄⁄⁄ 0.127⁄⁄⁄
UQAO_EXPLAN 0.071⁄⁄⁄ 0.075⁄⁄⁄ 0.746⁄⁄⁄
QUAO 0.072⁄⁄⁄ 0.078⁄⁄⁄ 0.533⁄⁄⁄ 0.054⁄⁄⁄
DISC_ADVS 0.062⁄⁄⁄ 0.065⁄⁄⁄ 0.300⁄⁄⁄ 0.030⁄⁄⁄ 0.022⁄
MAO_FT 0.049⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.585⁄⁄⁄ 0.464⁄⁄⁄ 0.317⁄⁄⁄ 0.103⁄⁄⁄
MAO_NFT 0.107⁄⁄⁄ 0.115⁄⁄⁄ 0.773⁄⁄⁄ 0.556⁄⁄⁄ 0.409⁄⁄⁄ 0.288⁄⁄⁄ 0.061⁄⁄⁄
OCF 0.136⁄⁄⁄ 0.128⁄⁄⁄ 0.017 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.015
PRIV 0.051⁄⁄⁄ 0.039⁄⁄⁄ 0.070⁄⁄⁄ 0.040⁄⁄⁄ 0.042⁄⁄⁄ 0.041⁄⁄⁄ 0.011 0.078⁄⁄⁄ 0.005
ROA 0.164⁄⁄⁄ 0.168⁄⁄⁄ 0.289⁄⁄⁄ 0.142⁄⁄⁄ 0.187⁄⁄⁄ 0.201⁄⁄⁄ 0.158⁄⁄⁄ 0.232⁄⁄⁄ 0.125⁄⁄⁄ 0.083⁄⁄⁄
GROWTH 0.150⁄⁄⁄ 0.146⁄⁄⁄ 0.071⁄⁄⁄ 0.024⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄ 0.075⁄⁄⁄ 0.028⁄⁄ 0.096⁄⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄⁄ 0.259⁄⁄⁄
TQ 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄⁄ 0.130⁄⁄⁄ 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.046⁄⁄⁄ 0.095⁄⁄⁄ 0.035⁄⁄⁄ 0.133⁄⁄⁄ 0.014 0.048⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.003
LEV 0.093⁄⁄⁄ 0.101⁄⁄⁄ 0.354⁄⁄⁄ 0.167⁄⁄⁄ 0.198⁄⁄⁄ 0.320⁄⁄⁄ 0.097⁄⁄⁄ 0.360⁄⁄⁄ 0.031⁄⁄⁄ 0.114⁄⁄⁄ 0.459⁄⁄⁄ 0.020⁄ 0.005
SIZE 0.041⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄ 0.177⁄⁄⁄ 0.121⁄⁄⁄ 0.079⁄⁄⁄ 0.107⁄⁄⁄ 0.067⁄⁄⁄ 0.166⁄⁄⁄ 0.043⁄⁄⁄ 0.168⁄⁄⁄ 0.231⁄⁄⁄ 0.074⁄⁄⁄ 0.452⁄⁄⁄ 0.019
Note: The table reports Pearson correlation coefﬁcients, ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
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4.1. Multivariate regression results
Table 5 reports the regression results for model (2). We are concerned with the coefﬁcient (b3) on the interaction term
(MAOit1  OCFit). If receiving a MAO means greater information asymmetry and increased agency costs, then the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing constraints should be strengthened and b3 should be signiﬁcantly positive. However, if receiving a MAO signals
an increase in the ﬁrm’s operational or ﬁnancial risks, then the ﬁrm has incentives to seek government support or controlling
shareholders’ assistance, which may lead to soft budget constraints. It would then be easier for enterprises to obtain subsi-
dies from the government or to obtain loans from banks or related parties. In this case, the ﬁnancing constraints of the ﬁrm
may be unchanged or even reduced, and b3 should be zero or signiﬁcantly negative. Column (1) of Table 5 presents the OLS
regression results for model (2). The results show that the estimated coefﬁcient (b3) on MAOit1  OCFit is 0.083, and the t-
statistic is 2.22 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This shows that ﬁnancial constraints decreased after ﬁrms received MAOs
when controlling for other factors, such as the ultimate controller, growth opportunities, size, year and industry effects.
These results show that the role of soft budget constraints is more critical than the role of information asymmetry.
With the regression in column (1) of Table 5, we control for year and industry ﬁxed effects, but cannot guarantee that
there are no other unobservable ﬁxed effects that could affect ﬁnancing constraints. To control for omitted variable bias,
in column (2) we use panel data to estimate model (2). Because the p-value is clearly different from zero in a Hausman Test,
we choose the ﬁxed effects model. In column (2), the coefﬁcient on MAOit1  OCFit is still 0.083 and the signiﬁcance level
does not qualitatively change after controlling for unobservable ﬁxed effects, which indicates that the OLS regression results
are not caused by unobservable ﬁxed effects. We divide MAOs into three types and investigate whether the relationship we
ﬁnd is driven by the type of MAO. Column (3) presents the OLS regression results for model (3), and column (4) presents the
regression results for the ﬁxed effects panel data model. Both results are qualitatively consistent. In column (3), the esti-
mated coefﬁcient for the interaction term on qualiﬁed opinions and cash ﬂows from operating activities (QUAOit1  OCFit)
is 0.148, and the t-statistic is 2.35 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term on cash ﬂowsTable 5
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints.
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment (ICF) OLS FE OLS FE
CONSTANT 0.017 0.093 0.039 0.000
(0.13) (0.53) (0.31) <0.000
OCF 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄
(3.53) (2.97) (3.54) (2.97)
MAO 0.195⁄⁄⁄ 0.157⁄⁄⁄
(12.97) (10.15)
MAO⁄OCF 0.083⁄⁄ 0.083⁄⁄
(2.22) (2.26)
UQAO_EXPLAN 0.177⁄⁄⁄ 0.142⁄⁄⁄
(9.66) (7.42)
QUAO 0.206⁄⁄⁄ 0.170⁄⁄⁄
(8.81) (6.98)
DISC_ADVS 0.274⁄⁄⁄ 0.220⁄⁄⁄
(16.35) (10.65)
UQAO_EXPLAN⁄OCF 0.048 0.047
(1.14) (1.22)
QUAO⁄OCF 0.148⁄⁄ ;0.150⁄⁄
(2.35) (2.37)
DISC_ADVS⁄OCF 0.032 0.037
(0.60) (0.74)
PRIV 0.067⁄⁄⁄ 0.073⁄⁄⁄ 0.068⁄⁄⁄ 0.073⁄⁄⁄
(4.42) (3.62) (4.49) (3.64)
PRIV⁄OCF 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.000
(0.38) (0.02) (0.40) (0.02)
GROWTH 0.108⁄⁄⁄ 0.096⁄⁄⁄ 0.106⁄⁄⁄ 0.094⁄⁄⁄
(7.15) (6.89) (6.91) (6.62)
SIZE 0.020⁄⁄⁄ 0.012 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.011
(3.46) (1.50) (3.33) (1.36)
YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
IND CONTROL CONTROL
N 9249 9249 9249 9249
R2 0.074 0.059 0.075 0.060
Note: The table reports OLS and ﬁxed effects coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroske-
dasticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
Columns (2) and (4) are the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. The sample period is 1998–2006.
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cient on the interaction term on the other modiﬁed opinions and cash ﬂows from operating activities; however, neither sig-
niﬁcantly differs from zero. The results indicate that the ﬁndings we reported above are mainly driven by ﬁrms that received
qualiﬁed opinions.4.2. Robustness tests
4.2.1. Net cash outﬂows of investing activities
We implement three additional tests to verify the reliability of the conclusion that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints decrease
after receiving MAOs. First, in Table 5, we use cash payments to acquire ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term
assets, divided by the yearly beginning balance of ﬁxed assets to measure ﬁrms’ investment expenditure (ICF). We also use
net cash outﬂows of investment activities (NICF) as another measure of investment expenditure. NICF is deﬁned as the cash
payments to acquire ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets, minus the cash inﬂow of disposing of the
aforementioned assets, divided by the yearly beginning balance of ﬁxed assets. Table 6 reports the regression results using
NICF as the dependent variable, and we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences from the results in Table 5.4.2.2. Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment opportunities
Xu et al. (2006) argue that the use of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities may introduce measurement error
for three reasons: (1) the efﬁciency of the Chinese stock market needs to be improved; (2) the high volatility and high turn-
over of the Chinese stock market has led to potential bias in price-based indicators; and (3) dealer participation and market
speculation affect the market returns of private holding companies. As a result, we use the rate of sales growth to measure
ﬁrms’ investment opportunities, following Luo and Zhen (2008). To investigate the reliability of our results, we introduce
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for ﬁrms’ investment opportunities, which has been widely used in the extant literature (FazzariTable 6
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (dependent variable is net cash outﬂow of investment activities).
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment (NICF) OLS FE OLS FE
CONSTANT 0.207 0.247 0.185 0.226
(1.60) (1.52) (1.45) (1.39)
OCF 0.050⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄ 0.050⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄
(3.03) (2.57) (3.01) (2.55)
MAO 0.169⁄⁄⁄ 0.137⁄⁄⁄
(9.96) (7.76)
MAO⁄OCF 0.089⁄ 0.088⁄
(1.92) (1.87)
UQAO_EXPLAN 0.147⁄⁄⁄ 0.122⁄⁄⁄
(6.86) (5.31)
QUAO 0.189⁄⁄⁄ 0.150⁄⁄⁄
(7.62) (6.18)
DISC_ADVS 0.249⁄⁄⁄ 0.205⁄⁄⁄
(12.39) (9.16)
UQAO_EXPLAN⁄OCF 0.052 0.051
(1.01) (1.00)
QUAO⁄OCF 0.161⁄⁄ 0.157⁄⁄
(2.07) (1.96)
DISC_ADVS⁄OCF 0.055 0.059
(1.04) (1.19)
PRIV 0.063⁄⁄⁄ 0.066⁄⁄⁄ 0.064⁄⁄⁄ 0.066⁄⁄⁄
(4.00) (3.33) (4.06) (3.34)
PRIV⁄OCF 0.029 0.023 0.031 0.025
(0.91) (0.61) (0.96) (0.68)
GROWTH 0.113⁄⁄⁄ 0.099⁄⁄⁄ 0.112⁄⁄⁄ 0.097⁄⁄⁄
(6.34) (5.85) (6.17) (5.67)
SIZE 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.027⁄⁄⁄ 0.027⁄⁄⁄ 0.026⁄⁄⁄
(4.84) (3.54) (4.74) (3.42)
YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
IND CONTROL CONTROL
N 7729 7729 7729 7729
R2 0.080 0.065 0.082 0.067
Note: The table reports OLS and ﬁxed effects coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroske-
dasticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
Columns (2) and (4) are the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. The sample period is 1998–2006. The sample includes only 7729 observations due
to missing data in NICF.
Table 7
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (using Tobin’s Q to proxy for investment opportunities).
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment (ICF) OLS FE OLS FE
CONSTANT 0.579⁄⁄⁄ <0.000 0.561⁄⁄⁄ 0.489⁄⁄
(3.76) 0.000 (3.69) (2.34)
OCF 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄ 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄⁄
(3.72) (3.14) (3.71) (3.14)
MAO 0.209⁄⁄⁄ 0.166⁄⁄⁄
(13.84) (10.66)
MAO_OCF 0.077⁄ 0.076⁄⁄
(1.94) (1.99)
UQAO_EXPLAN 0.184⁄⁄⁄ 0.146⁄⁄⁄
(9.83) (7.47)
QUAO 0.221⁄⁄⁄ 0.178⁄⁄⁄
(9.46) (7.15)
DISC_ADVS 0.348⁄⁄⁄ 0.281⁄⁄⁄
(19.95) (12.93)
UQAO_EXPLAN_OCF 0.040 0.040
(0.88) (0.94)
QUAO_OCF 0.148⁄⁄ 0.149⁄⁄
(2.37) (2.36)
DISC_ADVS_OCF 0.087⁄⁄⁄ 0.067⁄⁄
(2.62) (2.00)
PRIV 0.073⁄⁄⁄ 0.081⁄⁄⁄ 0.073⁄⁄⁄ 0.081⁄⁄⁄
(4.71) (3.96) (4.77) (3.96)
PRIV_OCF 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.001
(0.34) (0.07) (0.36) (0.02)
TQ 0.082⁄⁄⁄ 0.075⁄⁄⁄ 0.084⁄⁄⁄ 0.077⁄⁄⁄
(6.43) (4.64) (6.57) (4.67)
SIZE 0.043⁄⁄⁄ 0.036⁄⁄⁄ 0.042⁄⁄⁄ 0.035⁄⁄⁄
(6.62) (3.93) (6.55) (3.78)
YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
IND CONTROL CONTROL
N 9249 9249 9249 9249
R2 0.066 0.051 0.068 0.053
Note: The table reports OLS and ﬁxed effect coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedas-
ticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
Columns (2) and (4) are the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. The sample period is 1998–2006. Tobin’s Q is used here is an alternative measure of
growth opportunities.
Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154 145et al., 1988; Fan et al., 2008a; Zhu et al., 2006). Table 7 reports the regression results including Tobin’s Q, and the main results
are not signiﬁcantly different from those reported in Table 5.4.2.3. Financial distress
Our ﬁnding that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints decrease after receiving MAOs does not control for the possibility that the
relationship may be caused by ﬁnancial distress. We use two methods to exclude the potential effects of ﬁnancial distress.
First, we delete observations with negative equity to test whether the results in Table 5 are mainly caused by ﬁnancially dis-
tressed companies. The regression results are reported in Table 8. We ﬁnd that after excluding insolvent ﬁrms there are no
signiﬁcant differences between the main results reported in Tables 8 and 5, which conﬁrms that the ﬁnancial constraints of
ﬁrms not in ﬁnancial distress are signiﬁcantly lower after receiving MAOs.
Second, following Fan et al. (2009), we use three methods to deﬁne whether a ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress. The ﬁrst is the
Z-score method. We calculate a Z-score for every ﬁrm-year observation and determine that a ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress if its
Z-score is less than 1.81.6 The second is the ﬁnancial leverage method. We deﬁne a ﬁrm as being in ﬁnancial distress if its lever-
age ratio is greater than one. The third is the interest coverage ratio method. We deﬁne a ﬁrm as in ﬁnancial distress if the ﬁrm’s
EBIT is lower than its ﬁnancial expenses. We then deﬁne a dummy variable, Distressed, coded 1 if the company is in ﬁnancial
distress and 0 otherwise. Table 9 reports the regression results after controlling for ﬁnancial distress. The results indicate that
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints still signiﬁcantly ease after receiving MAOs even after controlling for ﬁnancial distress. We retest all
of the regressions including these controls for ﬁnancial distress and all of the reported conclusions remain substantially un-
changed, which conﬁrms that the results are not caused by ﬁnancial difﬁculties.6 Fan et al. (2009) use the following formula to calculate the company’s Z-score: Z = A ⁄ 3.3 + B ⁄ 0.99 + C ⁄ 0.6 + D ⁄ 1.2 + E ⁄ 1.4, where A = EBIT/total assets,
B = sales/total assets, C = market value of equity/total liabilities, D = working capital/total assets, E = retained earnings/total assets. Book value per share and
market price per share are used to calculate the market value of equity (MVE) of non-tradable shares. Using a different method to calculate MVE does not affect
the main results of this paper.
Table 8
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (excluding insolvent ﬁrms).
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment (ICF) OLS FE OLS FE
CONSTANT 0.220 0.000 0.232⁄ 0.159
(1.61) <0.000 (1.72) (0.88)
OCF 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄
(3.51) (2.95) (3.52) (2.97)
MAO 0.183⁄⁄⁄ 0.148⁄⁄⁄
(11.11) (9.02)
MAO_OCF 0.085⁄⁄ 0.083⁄⁄
(2.13) (2.10)
UQAO_EXPLAN 0.170⁄⁄⁄ 0.139⁄⁄⁄
(8.82) (6.91)
QUAO 0.193⁄⁄⁄ 0.155⁄⁄⁄
(7.12) (5.56)
DISC_ADVS 0.274⁄⁄⁄ 0.223⁄⁄⁄
(12.07) (8.65)
UQAO_EXPLAN_OCF 0.047 0.044
(1.02) (1.02)
QUAO_OCF 0.149⁄⁄ 0.150⁄⁄
(2.29) (2.28)
DISC_ADVS_OCF 0.069 0.069
(1.23) (1.23)
PRIV 0.069⁄⁄⁄ 0.074⁄⁄⁄ 0.070⁄⁄⁄ 0.074⁄⁄⁄
(4.38) (3.55) (4.47) (3.59)
PRIV_OCF 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.000
(0.38) (0.03) (0.38) (0.01)
GROWTH 0.110⁄⁄⁄ 0.097⁄⁄⁄ 0.108⁄⁄⁄ 0.095⁄⁄⁄
(6.96) (6.65) (6.69) (6.35)
SIZE 0.017⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.009
(2.86) (1.16) (2.80) (1.07)
YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
IND CONTROL CONTROL
N 9042 9042 9042 9042
R2 0.069 0.054 0.071 0.055
Note: The table reports OLS and ﬁxed effect coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedas-
ticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
Columns (2) and (4) are the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. The sample period is 1998–2006. We exclude all observations that have negative
shareholder equity.
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MAOs, and this ﬁnding is mainly driven by ﬁrms that received qualiﬁed opinions. The aforementioned empirical results show
that increased information asymmetry as a result of receiving MAOs did not increase ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints, as they
either remained unchanged or decreased. This supports the view that the role of soft budget constraints is more important
than information asymmetry.4.3. Additional tests
4.3.1. Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints: distinguishing between two kinds of ultimate controllers
Many studies indicate that government-controlled listed companies are able to invest in more industries and projects,
and ﬁnd it easier to access ﬁnance and obtain government assistance in a crisis (Lin et al., 1999; Lin and Li, 2004; Sun
et al., 2005, 2006; Liu et al., 2007). To overcome this competitive disadvantage, private enterprises have strong motivations
to establish political connections, which can also help ﬁrms to reduce investment barriers, gain access to better ﬁnancing
opportunities and obtain more tax beneﬁts (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2008,
2009; Luo and Tang, 2009; Luo and Liu, 2009; Luo and Huang, 2008). We classify the sample into two groups according
to their ultimate controllers to investigate whether the type of ultimate controller changes the conclusions.
Table 10 reports the regression results based on the two types of ultimate controllers. Columns (1) and (2) present the OLS
regression results. PRIV = 0 includes all listed companies whose ultimate controllers are government agencies, and PRIV = 1
includes all listed companies whose ultimate controllers are non-government agencies or individuals. In the government-
controlled group, the coefﬁcient on MAOit1  OCFit is 0.096, and the t-statistic is 1.85 and signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
In the non-government-controlled group, the coefﬁcient on MAOit1  OCFit is 0.065 and the t-statistic is 1.17, which is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero. To control for possible unobservable ﬁxed effects, we use a ﬁxed effects panel data mod-
el to run the regression using the two subsamples. Our results are not substantively different. The results in Table 10 show
Table 9
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (controlling for ﬁnancial distress) (INVSTit = b0 + b1OCFit + b2MAOit1 + b3MAOit1  OCFit + b4DISit +
b5DISit  OCFit + b6PRIVit + b7PRIVit  OCFit + b8GROWTHit + b9SIZEit + FixedEffects + eit).
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment (ICF) Z-score1 Z-score2 Leverage Interest coverage
CONS 0.088 0.100 0.078 0.184
(0.69) (0.78) (0.60) (1.43)
OCF 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄⁄
(3.09) (3.29) (3.53) (3.68)
MAO 0.164⁄⁄⁄ 0.165⁄⁄⁄ 0.178⁄⁄⁄ 0.155⁄⁄⁄
(10.39) (10.51) (11.28) (9.61)
MAO_OCF 0.081⁄⁄ 0.082⁄⁄ 0.085⁄⁄ 0.077⁄
(2.18) (2.22) (2.14) (1.93)
DIS1 0.083⁄⁄⁄
(6.80)
DIS1⁄OCF 0.016
(0.66)
DIS2 0.084⁄⁄⁄
(7.04)
DIS1⁄OCF 0.010
(0.38)
DIS3 0.120⁄⁄⁄
(7.20)
DIS3⁄OCF 0.018
(0.48)
DIS4 0.153⁄⁄⁄
(11.94)
DIS4⁄OCF 0.097⁄
(1.95)
N 9249 9249 9249 9248
R2 0.080 0.078 0.075 0.085
Note: The table reports OLS coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent. ⁄,
⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2. DIS is a ﬁnancial distress
dummy variable. DIS1 and DIS2 are calculated based on Z-zcores. DIS equals 1 if the Z-score is less than 1.81, zero otherwise. Z-score1 uses the book value
per share to calculate the value of untradable shares, whereas Z-score2 uses the market value per share to calculate the value of untradable shares. DIS3
equals 1 if leverage is larger than 1, zero otherwise. DIS4 equals 1 if EBIT is less than ﬁnancial expenses, zero otherwise. The sample period is 1998–2006.
We omit regression results on other control variables.
Table 10
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (distinguishing between two types of ultimate controllers).
Dependent variable: OLS FE
Investment (ICF) PRIV = 0 PRIV = 1 PRIV = 0 PRIV = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.338⁄⁄ 0.342 0.000 0.166
(2.30) (1.05) 0.000 (0.42)
OCF 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄
(3.50) (2.69) (2.89) (2.04)
MAO 0.180⁄⁄⁄ 0.202⁄⁄⁄ 0.143⁄⁄⁄ 0.174⁄⁄⁄
(10.42) (6.16) (8.38) (5.00)
MAO⁄OCF 0.096⁄ 0.065 0.086⁄ 0.076
(1.85) (1.17) (1.70) (1.49)
GROWTH 0.125⁄⁄⁄ 0.081⁄⁄⁄ 0.107⁄⁄⁄ 0.075⁄⁄⁄
(6.72) (3.12) (6.31) (3.14)
SIZE 0.012⁄ 0.042⁄⁄⁄ 0.013 0.032⁄
(1.88) (2.82) (1.43) (1.68)
YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
IND CONTROL CONTROL
N 7130 2119 7130 2119
R2 0.074 0.101 0.055 0.073
Note: The table reports OLS and ﬁxed effect coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedas-
ticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
PRIV = 0 contains all observations for which the ultimate controller is a government agency. PRIV = 1 contains all observations for which the ultimate
controller is a non-government agency or individual. Columns (3) and (4) are the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. The sample period is 1998–
2006.
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148 Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154that the ﬁnancial constraints of government-controlled companies signiﬁcantly decreased after receiving MAOs, indicating
that soft budget constraints have a greater effect in government-controlled companies.
4.3.2. Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints: whether ﬁrms received modiﬁed opinions for the ﬁrst time
Table 1 shows that 621 ﬁrms were issued modiﬁed audit opinions, 428 of which received more than one. It is easy for the
market to form expectations if a ﬁrm has been issued with MAOs on several occasions. Therefore, ﬁrms that receive MAOs for
the ﬁrst time should affect the market more than ﬁrms that have received one previously. In accordance with the IAV, if
MAOs increase corporate ﬁnancing constraints, then the results are more likely to show in ﬁrms that receive MAOs for
the ﬁrst time. We adopt model (4) to test whether the relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and MAOs received for
the ﬁrst time differs from that between ﬁnancial constraints and MAOs received not for the ﬁrst time. MAO_FTit1  OCFit
tests the effect of receiving MAOs for the ﬁrst time on ﬁnancial constraints, andMAO_NFTit1  OCFit tests the effect of receiv-
ing MAOs not for the ﬁrst time on ﬁnancial constraints.Table 1
Modiﬁe
ultimat
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MAO
MAO
MAO
MAO
PRIV
PRIV
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SIZE
YEAR
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R2
Note: T
ticity-c
PRIV =
controlINVSTit ¼ b0 þ b1OCFit þ b2MAO FTit1 þ b3MAO NFTit1 þ b4MAO FTit1  OCFit þ b5MAO NFTit1  OCFit
þ b6PRIVit þ b7PRIVit  OCFit þ b8GROWTHit þ b9SIZEit þ FixedEffectsþ eit ð4ÞColumn (1) of Table 11 reports the OLS regression results. The coefﬁcient on MAO_FTit1  OCFit is 0.134, the t-statistic is
2.06 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In addition, the coefﬁcient on MAO_NFTit1  OCFit is 0.056, and is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. Column (2) presents the regression results using the ﬁxed effects panel data model, which are not sub-
stantially different from the OLS results. The two regression results show that MAOs affect ﬁnancial constraints when ﬁrms
receive them for the ﬁrst time, and ﬁnancial constraints do not signiﬁcantly change when ﬁrms receive MAOs not for the ﬁrst
time. Columns (3) and (4) test whether these results are dependent on the type of ultimate controller. The results indicate
that ﬁrms whose ﬁnancial constraints reduced after receiving MAOs for the ﬁrst time were mainly government-controlled
listed companies, whereas the ﬁnancial constraints for non-government-controlled ﬁrms did not change signiﬁcantly after
receiving MAOs.
4.4. Alternative explanations
4.4.1. Whether auditors are over-conservative
In addition to the hypothesis regarding the lack of economic consequences arising from MAOs, the high proportion of
ﬁrms receiving MAOs in China could also be explained by the hypothesis that auditors choose over-conservative audit1
d audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (whether modiﬁed audit opinion is received for the ﬁrst time and the distinction between two types of
e controllers).
ndent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
stment (ICF) OLS FE PRIV = 0 PRIV = 1
STANT 0.034 0.000 0.346⁄⁄ 0.322
(0.26) <0.000 (2.38) (0.98)
0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.052⁄⁄⁄ 0. 055⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄⁄⁄
(3.52) (2.95) (3.50) (2.69)
_FT 0.142⁄⁄⁄ 0.129⁄⁄⁄ 0. 118⁄⁄⁄ 0.177⁄⁄⁄
(5.89) (5.60) (4.27) (4.15)
_NFT 0.225⁄⁄⁄ 0.174⁄⁄⁄ 0. 220⁄⁄⁄ 0.213⁄⁄⁄
(13.66) (9.45) (13.98)v (5.75)
_FT⁄OCF 0.134⁄⁄ 0.135⁄⁄ 0.230⁄⁄ 0.043
(2.06) (2.05) (2.24) (1.23)
_NFT⁄OCF (0.056) 0.055 0.037 0.080
(1.34) (1.45) (1.01) (0.96)
0.068⁄⁄⁄ 0.073⁄⁄⁄
(4.45) (3.63)
⁄OCF 0.010 0.000
(0.40) (0.01)
WTH 0.110⁄⁄⁄ 0.098⁄⁄⁄ 0. 126⁄⁄⁄ 0.081⁄⁄⁄
(7.24) (6.94) (6.78) (3.21)
0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.012 0.011⁄ 0.041⁄⁄⁄
(3.32) (1.42) (1.81) (2.73)
CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
9249 9249 7130 2119
0.075 0.060 0.078 0.101
he table reports OLS and ﬁxed effect coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedas-
onsistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
0 contains all observations for which the ultimate controller is a government agency. PRIV = 1 contains all observations for which the ultimate
ler is a non-government agency or individual. Column (2) is the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. The sample period is 1998–2006.
Table 12
Modiﬁed audit opinions and ﬁnancial constraints (time series tests).
Dependent variable: 1995–1997 1998–2006 2007–2009
Investment (ICF) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
CONSTANT 1.336 0.466 0.017 0.093 0.517⁄⁄ 0.000
(0.72) (0.79) (0.13) (0.53) (2.53) (<0.000)
OCF 0.086 0.094 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.035⁄⁄ 0.028⁄
(1.54) (1.62) (3.53) (2.97) (2.05) (1.75)
MAO 0.100 0.054 0.195⁄⁄⁄ 0.157⁄⁄⁄ 0.189⁄⁄⁄ 0.141⁄⁄⁄
(0.83) (0.45) (12.97) (10.15) (6.06) (3.55)
MAO⁄OCF 0.336⁄⁄⁄ 0.318⁄⁄⁄ 0.083⁄⁄ 0.083⁄⁄ 0.020 0.004
(3.21) (2.94) (2.22) (2.26) (0.41) (0.07)
PRIV 0.241⁄ 0.217⁄ 0.067⁄⁄⁄ 0.073⁄⁄⁄ 0.123⁄⁄⁄ 0.154⁄⁄⁄
(1.77) (1.83) (4.42) (3.62) (5.70) (5.71)
PRIV⁄OCF 0.074 0.088 0.010 0.001 0.023 0.025
(0.69) (0.91) (0.38) (0.02) (0.85) (1.05)
GROWTH 0.461⁄⁄⁄ 0.461⁄⁄⁄ 0.108⁄⁄⁄ 0.096⁄⁄⁄ 0.190⁄⁄⁄ 0.164⁄⁄⁄
(4.53) (4.47) (7.15) (6.89) (6.14) (5.59)
SIZE 0.035 0.030 0.020⁄⁄⁄ 0.012 0.039⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄⁄
(1.11) (1.06) (3.46) (1.50) (4.49) (4.11)
N 695 695 9249 9249 4456 4456
R2 0.182 0.148 0.074 0.059 0.093 0.073
Note: The table reports OLS and ﬁxed effect coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedas-
ticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2.
PRIV = 0 contains all observations for which the ultimate controller is a government agency. PRIV = 1 contains all observations for which the ultimate
controller is a non-government agency or individual. Columns (2), (4) and (6) are the results of the ﬁxed effects panel data model. Columns (1) and (2) use
observations from 1995 to 1997. Columns (3) and (4) use observations from 1998 to 2006. Columns (5) and (6) use observations from 2007 to 2009.
Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154 149opinions due to high risk.7 Li and Wu (2002) ﬁnd the audit risk of auditors increased signiﬁcantly after 1997. Greater audit risk
led auditors to choose more conservative audit opinions to reduce their own risk. Over-conservative audit opinions reduce their
usefulness and MAOs may not increase information asymmetry or ﬁnancial constraints. If the over-conservative auditor
hypothesis is true, then ﬁrms that received MAOs are likely to have greater information asymmetry and thus have stronger
ﬁnancial constraints in the period when the auditors do not have an incentive to be over conservative. Speciﬁcally, the over-
conservative auditor hypothesis expects that in the low audit risk period (1995–1997), the ﬁnancial constraints of the ﬁrms
receiving MAOs will be signiﬁcantly greater than in the high audit risk period (1998–2006). We use model (2) to test this
alternative hypothesis.
We divide the sample into three stages, the ﬁrst from 1995 to 1997, the second from 1998 to 2006 and the third from
2007 to 2009. According to the over-conservative auditor hypothesis, the coefﬁcient on MAOit1  OCFit should be signiﬁ-
cantly positive for 1995–1997, and not signiﬁcant after 1998. We use the difference between net proﬁt and total accruals
as the proxy for net cash ﬂows from operating activities because the statement of cash ﬂows were not reported until
1998, so the data on net cash ﬂows from operating activities and cash outﬂow for investment in 1995–1997 cannot be ob-
tained. Following Francis et al. (2005), we use model (5) to calculate the total accruals (TACCit1), in whichDCAit is the change
in current assets, DCASHit is the change in the cash account, DCLit is the change in current liabilities, DSTDit is the change in
short-term liabilities and D DE PNit is depreciation expense in the current period. Additionally, we use the change in the an-
nual balance of ﬁxed assets as a proxy for ﬁrms’ investment from 1995 to 1997.7 Tha
hypotheTACCit ¼ DCAit  DCASHit  DCLit þ DSTDit  DEPNit ð5ÞColumns (1) and (2) of Table 12 present the regression results for the OLS and ﬁxed effects panel data models and there are
no signiﬁcant differences between the two results, which indicates that there is no obvious missing variable bias in the OLS
regression. The OLS results show that the coefﬁcient onMAOit1  OCFit is 0.336, and the t-statistic is 3.21 and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. The results indicate that rather than increasing, ﬁnancial constraints signiﬁcantly decreased when ﬁrms re-
ceived MAOs between 1995 and 1997.
The time-series test in Table 12 indicates an important trend whereby the highest decrease in the ﬁnancial constraints of
ﬁrms receiving MAOs occurred between 1995 and 1997 and the lowest between 1998 and 2006. Since 2007, the ﬁnancial
constraints of ﬁrms that received MAOs have not signiﬁcantly changed. The time-series trend in the ﬁnancial constraints
of ﬁrms receiving MAOs does not support the prediction of the over-conservative auditor hypothesis or the information
asymmetry hypothesis, but is consistent with the prediction of the soft budget constraints hypothesis. With the deepening
of China’s economic reforms, the budget constraints on enterprises (especially state-owned enterprises) have becomenks to Doctor Ge Rui of Sun Yat-Sen University for putting forward this alternative explanation, and for suggesting we use the pre-1988 data to test this
sis.
Table 13
Modiﬁed audit opinions and debt ﬁnancing (BCFit = b0 + b1MAOit1 + b2PRIVit + b3ICFit + b4GROWTHit + b5ROAit1 + b6LEVit1 + b7SIZEit + INDFE + eit).
BCF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
CONSTANT 0.165 0.035 0.281 0.341⁄ 0.172 0.327⁄ 0.258 0.554⁄⁄⁄ 0.602⁄⁄⁄ 0.782⁄⁄⁄ 0.794⁄⁄⁄ 1.300⁄⁄⁄
(0.76) (0.17) (1.30) (1.75) (0.99) (1.68) (1.44) (3.58) (3.96) (3.45) (6.25) (6.76)
MAO 0.024 0.012 0.038 0.001 0.020 0.047⁄ 0.030 0.049⁄⁄ 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.149⁄⁄⁄ 0.156⁄⁄⁄ 0.175⁄⁄⁄
(0.89) (0.54) (1.63) (0.03) (0.79) (1.94) (0.88) (2.14) (3.96) (5.91) (5.28) (5.18)
PRIV 0.018 0.007 0.021 0.069⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.028⁄⁄ 0.024⁄ 0.018 0.027⁄⁄
(0.60) (0.28) (0.82) (2.74) (2.64) (1.20) (0.80) (1.55) (2.22) (1.84) (1.41) (2.05)
ICF 0.021 0.032⁄⁄ 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.035⁄⁄ 0.021 0.080⁄⁄⁄ 0.133⁄⁄⁄ 0.076⁄⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.067⁄⁄⁄ 0.033⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄⁄⁄
(1.26) (2.17) (4.46) (2.35) (1.59) (4.24) (6.61) (4.30) (4.46) (3.79) (2.94) (4.29)
GROWTH 0.080⁄⁄ 0.032⁄⁄ 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.059⁄⁄⁄ 0.031⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄⁄ 0.020 0.027⁄ 0.007 0.035⁄⁄ 0.061⁄⁄⁄ 0.069⁄⁄⁄
(2.40) (2.07) (2.80) (3.27) (1.98) (2.71) (1.63) (1.83) (0.64) (2.50) (3.40) (3.72)
ROA 0.288⁄ 0.562⁄⁄⁄ 0.498⁄⁄⁄ 1.075⁄⁄⁄ 0.792⁄⁄⁄ 0.172 0.486⁄⁄⁄ 0.392⁄⁄⁄ 0.474⁄⁄⁄ 0.090 0.153⁄⁄ 0.130
(1.92) (3.84) (3.63) (5.84) (6.28) (1.45) (4.12) (4.09) (5.77) (1.04) (2.19) (1.31)
LEV 0.367⁄⁄⁄ 0.313⁄⁄⁄ 0.256⁄⁄⁄ 0.304⁄⁄⁄ 0.294⁄⁄⁄ 0.231⁄⁄⁄ 0.232⁄⁄⁄ 0.260⁄⁄⁄ 0.246⁄⁄⁄ 0.151⁄⁄⁄ 0.162⁄⁄⁄ 0.227⁄⁄⁄
(5.30) (5.78) (4.16) (5.41) (5.27) (4.16) (5.46) (5.79) (6.55) (5.35) (5.92) (6.79)
SIZE 0.010 0.002 0.015 0.016⁄ 0.013 0.023⁄⁄ 0.020⁄⁄ 0.032⁄⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄⁄
(0.99) (0.17) (1.43) (1.72) (1.60) (2.47) (2.38) (4.22) (5.18) (8.69) (8.22) (7.67)
INDFE CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
N 518 675 753 885 1001 1069 1115 1188 1173 1390 1507 1546
R2 0.172 0.150 0.184 0.168 0.163 0.122 0.144 0.157 0.174 0.205 0.195 0.215
Note: The table reports OLS coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent. ⁄,
⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions and measurements of all variables are in Table 2. BCF is borrowing cash
ﬂows from the Statements of Cash Flows.
Table 14
Modiﬁed audit opinions and changes in related-party loans (DRPBit ¼ b0 þ b1MAOit1 þ b2BIG4it þ b3PRIVitþ
b4ICFit þ b5ROAit þ b6TobinQit þ b7LEVit þ b8SIZEit þ FEþ eit).
Change of related-parties’ (1) (2)
Loans CRPB CNRPB
CONSTANT 0.036⁄⁄⁄ 0.113⁄⁄⁄
(3.00) (5.19)
MAO 0.004⁄ 0.022⁄⁄⁄
(1.93) (5.41)
BIG4 0.005⁄⁄⁄ 0.012⁄⁄⁄
(4.67) (5.48)
PRIV 0.001 0.006⁄⁄⁄
(0.56) (3.29)
ICF 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.005⁄⁄⁄
(2.75) (3.75)
ROA 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.088⁄⁄⁄
(9.97) (4.58)
Tobin Q 0.002⁄⁄ 0.001
(2.37) (0.63)
LEV 0.034⁄⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄⁄
(10.46) (8.02)
SIZE 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.007⁄⁄⁄
(4.32) (7.32)
Year FE CONTROL CONTROL
Ind FE CONTROL CONTROL
N 13691 13691
R2 0.116 0.060
Note: The table reports OLS coefﬁcient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors that
are heteroskedasticity-consistent. ⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄⁄⁄ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Deﬁnitions
and measurements of all variables are in Table 2. CRPB and CNRPB are proxies for related-party loans. CRPB is the
change of year-end other payables divided by year-end total assets. CNRPB is the change in the difference between
other payables and other receivables divided by year-end total assets. The sample period is 1998–2009.
150 Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154gradually harder and consequently there is less potential to obtain aid from government or controlling shareholders when
ﬁrms experience operating problems or ﬁnancial distress, which is indicated by the gradual increase in the ﬁnancial con-
straints coefﬁcient on MAOit1  OCFit.
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The probable reason that MAOs do not stimulate an increase in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints is that the ﬁnancing sources of
China’s listed companies are mainly controlling shareholders or banks, who have a lot of private information and may not be
inﬂuenced by public accounting information. In addition, the lending decisions of many banks are based on the availability of
mortgages, so again the quality of ﬁrms’ accounting information may not necessarily affect the bank’s lending decisions. If
the bank has access to substantial private information or its lending is based on mortgage availability, receiving MAOs will
not increase the information asymmetry between ﬁrms and banks.
Following Sun et al. (2006) and Yu and Pan (2008), we use model (6) to test the effect of receiving MAOs on ﬁrms’ bor-
rowing ability.BCFit ¼ b0 þ b1MAOit1 þ b2PRIVit þ b3ICFit þ b4GROWTHit þ b5ROAit1 þ b6LEVit1 þ b7SIZEit þ INDFEþ eit ð6ÞBCF is borrowing cash ﬂows, which is obtained from the statement of cash ﬂows, divided by the yearly beginning balance
of total assets. MAO is modiﬁed audit opinions, which equals 1 if ﬁrms received a MAO last year and 0 otherwise. PRIV is
the type of ultimate controller, which equals 1 if the ultimate controller is a non-government agency or individual and 0
otherwise. ICF is investment expenditure, which is deﬁned as cash ﬂows for investment expenditure divided by the yearly
beginning balance of ﬁxed assets. GROWTH is ﬁrms’ growth rate, deﬁned as this year’s sales minus last year’s sales, di-
vided by last year’s sales. ROA is the return on assets, deﬁned as the total proﬁt for last year plus the ﬁnancial expenses
for last year, divided by last year’s beginning balance of total assets. LEV is ﬁnancial leverage, deﬁned as the ratio of debt
to total year-end assets; SIZE is ﬁrm size, which equals the natural logarithm of the total year-end assets; and INDFE are
industry ﬁxed effects.
Table 13 reports the results of annual regressions of the effect of receivingMAOs on ﬁrms’ bank loans. We ﬁnd that receiv-
ing MAOs in the last year did not signiﬁcantly decrease ﬁrms’ borrowing cash ﬂows between 1998 and 2004 (except 2003).
However, receiving a MAO signiﬁcantly reduced ﬁrms’ borrowing cash ﬂows between 2005 and 2009, suggesting that MAOs
have affected bank decisions since 2005. The results indicate that MAOs have information content but did not signiﬁcantly
affect ﬁrms’ borrowing in the earlier years, partly due to other factors (such as political connections and propping up by con-
trolling shareholders) being more signiﬁcant.4.4.3. Analysis based on related-party loans
As reported above, before 2007 ﬁnancial constraints signiﬁcantly reduced after ﬁrms received MAOs, but since 2007 this
has not been the case (see Table 12). This suggests that before 2007, ﬁrms receiving a MAO obtained more external ﬁnancing
than ﬁrms receiving a standard unqualiﬁed opinion. However, based on the analysis of the relationship between bank loans
and MAOs, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ borrowing cash ﬂows did not change after receiving MAOs before 2005, but signiﬁcantly de-
creased after 2005 (see Table 13). Therefore, the decrease in ﬁnancial constraints after ﬁrms received MAOs was not due to
ﬁrms receiving more bank loans.
Based on theoretical analysis and the existing literature (Li, 2004; Jian and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010), one possible
explanation for why ﬁnancial constraints decreased after receiving MAOs is that ﬁrms were able to obtain funds for invest-
ment from controlling shareholders or related parties. Referring to Li et al. (2004) and Jiang et al. (2010), we use model (7) to
test whether ﬁrms received more funding from related parties after receiving MAOs:DRPBit ¼ b0 þ b1MAOit1 þ b2BIG4it þ b3PRIVit þ b4ICFit þ b5ROAit þ b6TobinQit þ b7LEVit þ b8SIZEit þ FEþ eit ð7ÞFollowing Li (2004), we use other payables (or other payables minus other receivables) as business loans obtained from other
ﬁrms.DRPB denotes the change in related-party loans. We use CRPB and CNRPB as proxies for changes in related-party loans.
CRPB equals the other payables at year-end divided by year-end total assets, minus the last year-end other payables balance
divided by the last year-end total assets. CNRPB equals the difference between the year-end other payables minus other
receivables, divided by the year-end total assets and the last year-end other payables minus other receivables, divided by
the last year-end total assets. MAOs denotes modiﬁed audit opinions, which equals 1 if ﬁrms received MAOs last year
and 0 otherwise. BIG4 is the auditor of the annual report, which equals 1 if the auditor is a big four auditor and 0 otherwise.
PRIV is the type of ultimate controller, which equals 1 if the ultimate controller is a non-government agency or individual,
and 0 otherwise. ICF denotes investment expenditure, which is deﬁned as the cash outﬂows of investment expenditure di-
vided by the last year’s ﬁxed assets. ROA is return on assets, deﬁned as total proﬁt plus ﬁnancial expenses, divided by total
assets. LEV is year-end debt to total assets ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total year-end assets. FE includes year and
industry ﬁxed effects.
Table 14 reports the regression results relating MAOs to changes in related parties’ loans. The results show that the coef-
ﬁcient on MAOs is signiﬁcantly positive, which indicates that ﬁrms receiving a MAO obtained signiﬁcantly more loans from
related parties than ﬁrms receiving a standard unqualiﬁed opinion. The results show that a major reason for the signiﬁcant
decrease in the ﬁnancial constraints of ﬁrms that received MAOs is that they were able to obtain more funds from related
parties.
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Unlike the analyses conducted from an audit independence perspective, we provide a simple analytical framework for
understanding why a high proportion of ﬁrms in China receive MAOs. On the one hand, ﬁrms have strong incentives to
manipulate earnings because regulators use accounting measures to regulate listed companies and because of related par-
ties’ tunneling and rent-seeking activities, and earnings management incentives increase the probability of substantial mis-
representation in annual reports. On the other hand, support from government and controlling shareholders increases the
soft budget constraint problem. Although receiving MAOs increases information risks, the economic consequences are lim-
ited because the allocation of resources is mainly dependent on government intervention or controlling shareholders’ activ-
ities. These two factors result in a high proportion of ﬁrms receiving MAOs in the Chinese stock market.
Our interpretation that too high a proportion of MAOs is not a good thing seems inconsistent with the extant literature, in
which researchers believe that issuing more MAOs is an indication that auditors are more independent. Our analytical frame-
work shows that both views are reasonable in certain contexts. Given the quality of ﬁrms’ accounting information, a higher
proportion of ﬁrms receiving MAOs denotes higher auditor independence, suggesting that MAOs are helpful for disclosing
negative information and helping outsiders determine the quality of accounting information. However, given the level of
auditor independence, more MAOs indicates stronger incentives to distort information. When audit quality has not signiﬁ-
cantly changed, too high a proportion of ﬁrms receiving MAOs means more noise in ﬁrms’ public accounting information.
Auditors will issue a MAO when they believe that ﬁnancial reports do not fairly reﬂect a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position, oper-
ating results and cash ﬂows according to the accounting standards. A high proportion of ﬁrms receiving MAOs suggests that
the accounting information quality of these ﬁrms is very poor, which increases the extent of adverse selection of outsiders
and the moral hazard of insiders. This situation does not help ﬁnancial report users to make accurate investment decisions.
In addition, it will hinder the resource allocation ability of the stock market in general and the protection of outside inves-
tors’ interests.
The situation has improved gradually. On the one hand, to protect the legitimate rights of investor and public interests,
regulators have introduced many policies and measures to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems, such as
the supervision of related-party tunneling and related-party transactions, the tradable share reforms of 2005, the weakening
of the role of accounting earnings in ﬁnance regulations, and so on. Listed companies’ incentives to manipulate earnings have
been reduced by these measures. On the other hand, ﬁrms’ soft budget constraints have been gradually relieved by the devel-
opment of ﬁnancial systems and enhanced competition in the ﬁnancial markets, along with the weakening of government
intervention and political connections. All of these measures help to improve the role of accounting information (particularly
audit opinions) in the investment and ﬁnancing decisions of investors, and increase the economic consequences of receiving
MAOs.8
The aforementioned reform measures have reduced the proportion of annual reports that receive MAOs because they re-
duce the incentive for earnings management and increase the economic consequences. This results in more decision-useful
accounting information and better protection of investors’ interests. In practice, the proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs
in 2007, 2008 and 2009 dropped to 8%, 6.9% and 6.7%, respectively. Thus, the weakening of earnings management incentives
and the hardening of soft budget constraints have improved accounting information quality in China, with a corresponding
decrease in the proportion of ﬁrms that received MAOs.
References
Aharony, J., Lee, C.W.J., Wong, T.J., 2000. Financial packaging of IPO ﬁrms in China. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1), 103–126.
Ball, R., 2001. Infrastructure Requirements for an Economically Efﬁcient System of Public Financial Reporting and Disclosure. Brookings–Wharton Papers on
Financial Services.
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P., Robin, A., 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 29, 1–51.
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1990. Financial fragility and economic performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (1), 87–114.
Chen, K.C.W., Yuan, H., 2004. Earnings management and capital resource allocation: evidence from China’s accounting-based regulation of rights issues.
Accounting Review 79 (3), 645–665.
Chen, S., Su, X., Wang, Z., 2005. An analysis of auditing environment and modiﬁed audit opinions in China: underlying reasons and lessons. International
Journal of Auditing 9 (3), 165–185.
Chen, Xinyuan, Xia, Lijun, Lin, Zhiwei, 2009. Why couldn’t independent auditing exert the corporate governance function: a case study on Sheng Run Gu
Fen’s receiving modiﬁed opinions in ﬁfteen consecutive years. Journal of Finance and Economics (China) (07), 63–75.
DeFond, M.L., Wong, T.J., Li, S., 2000. The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 28, 269–305.
Faccio, M., 2006. Politically connected ﬁrms. American Economic Review 96 (1), 369–386.
Faccio, M., Masulis, R.W., McConnell, J.J., 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance 61 (6), 2597–2635.
Fan, J., Wong, T., 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33
(3), 401–425.
Fan, P.H.J.P., Huang, J., Zhu, N., 2009. Distress without bankruptcy: an emerging market perspective. SSRN eLibrary.
Fan, J.P.H., Jin, L., Zheng, G., 2008a. Internal Capital Market in Emerging Markets: Expropriation and Mitigating Financing Constraints. Working paper.8 For example, ‘‘Administrative regulation for the securities issuance of listed companies’’, which came into effect on May 8, 2006, requires enterprises to
meet the following clauses before issuing new shares: ‘‘The ﬁnancial reports for the last three years were not issued with modiﬁed audit opinions. If the ﬁrm
received an unqualiﬁed opinion with an emphasis paragraph, the items must not have materially adverse effects on the issuer or the adverse effects must have
already been eliminated before share issuance.’’
Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154 153Fan, J.P.H., Rui, O.M., Zhao, M., 2008b. Public governance and corporate ﬁnance: evidence from corruption cases. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (3),
343–364.
Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J., 2005. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting
Research 43 (1), 35–72.
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G., Petersen, B.C., Blinder, A.S., Poterba, J.M., 1988. Financing constraints and corporate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (1), 141–206.
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., Schipper, K., 2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (2), 295–327.
Haw, I.M., Qi, D., Wu, D., Wu, W., 2005. Market consequences of earnings management in response to security regulations in China. Contemporary
Accounting Research 22 (1), 95–140.
He, Jiangang, Wei, Minghai, Liu, Feng, 2008. Transfer of beneﬁts, media monitoring and corporate governance: case studies of Wuliangye. Management
World (10), 141–150.
Jian, M., Wong, T.J., 2010. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies 15 (1), 70–105.
Jiang, G., Lee, C.M.C., Yue, H., 2010. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: the China experience. Journal of Financial Economics 98 (1), 1–20.
Jiang, Yihong, 1998. An empirical study on earnings management in listed companies–An analysis of threshold on EPS and ROE, Working Paper, Shanghai
University of Economics and Finance.
Johnson, S., Mitton, T., 2003. Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics 67 (2), 351–382.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance 57 (3), 1147–1170.
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., Verrecchia, R.E., 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 45 (2),
385–420.
Lennox, C., 2000. Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 321–337.
Leuz, C., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 2006. Political relationships, global ﬁnancing, and corporate transparency: evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial
Economics 81 (2), 411–439.
Leuz, C., Wysocki, P.D., 2008. Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research:
SSRN.
Li, D., Feng, J., Jiang, H., 2006. Institutional entrepreneurs. American Economic Review 96 (2), 358–362.
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., Zhou, L.A., 2008. Political connections, ﬁnancing and ﬁrm performance: evidence from Chinese private ﬁrms. Journal of
Development Economics 87, 283–299.
Li, Shuang, Wu, Xi, 2002. Audit failure and securities market supervision: the thinkings on announcement of China securities regulatory commission.
Accounting Research (China) (02), 28–36.
Li, Zengquan, Sun, Zheng, Wang, Zhiwei, 2004. Tunneling and ownership structure of a ﬁrm: evidence from controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of listed
company’s funds in China. Accounting Research (China) (12), 3–13.
Li, Zengquan, Yu, Qian, Wang, Xiaokun, 2005. Tunneling, propping and M&A: evidence from Chinese listed companies. Economic Research Journal (China)
(01), 95–105.
Liao, Xiumei, 2007. Usefulness of accounting information in bank credit decisions: based on the ownership institution constraints. Accounting Research
(China) (07), 31–38.
Lin, Shu, Wei, Minghai, 2000. The earnings management by Chinese A-share ﬁrms in the IPO process. China Accounting and Finance Review (China) 2 (02),
87–107.
Lin, Yifu, Cai, Fang, Li, Zhou, 1999. The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, China.
Lin, Yifu, Li, Zhiyun, 2004. Policy burden, moral hazard and soft budget constraint. Economic Research Journal (China) (02), 17–27.
Liu, Feng, He, Jiangang, 2004. Ownership structure and substantial shareholders’ choice in interest realizing methods: tentative study on tunneling in
Chinese capital market. China Accounting Review (China) 2 (01), 141–158.
Liu, Fengwei, Sun, Zheng, Li, Zengquan, 2007. Government intervention, competition and compensation contracts: empirical evidence from state-owned
listed companies. Management World (China) (09), 76–84.
Lu, Jianqiao, 1999. Empirical research on earnings management of China’s loss listed companies. Accounting Research (China) (09), 25–35.
Lu, Zhengfei, Zhu, Jigao, Sun, Bianxia, 2008. Earnings management, accounting information and bank debt covenants. Management World (China) (03), 152–
158.
Luo, Danglun, Huang, Qiongyu, 2008. The political connections and ﬁrm value of private enterprises. Journal of Management Science (China) (06),
21–28.
Luo, Danglun, Liu, Xiaolong, 2009. Political connections, entry barriers and ﬁrm’s performance. Management World (China) (05), 97–106.
Luo, Danglun, Tang, Qingquan, 2007. On the government control, bank-enterprises relationship and corporate guarantee behavior. Journal of Financial
Research (China) (03), 151–161.
Luo, Danglun, Tang, Qingquan, 2009. The performance of institutional environment evidence from China’s private listed companies. Economic Research
Journal (China) (02), 106–118.
Luo, Danglun, Zhen, Liming, 2008. Private control, political connections and corporate ﬁnancing: empirical evidence based on China’s private companies.
Journal of Financial Research (China) (12), 164–178.
Morck, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W., 2000. The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal
of Financial Economics 58 (1–2), 215–260.
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate ﬁnancing and investment decisions when ﬁrms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial
Economics 13 (2), 187–221.
Sun, Zheng, Li, Zengquan, Wang, Jingbin, 2006. Nature of ownership, accounting information and debt covenants: empirical evidence from China’s listed
companies. Management World (China) (10), 100–107.
Sun, Zheng, Liu, Fengwei, Li, Zengquan, 2005. Market development, government inﬂuence and corporate debt maturity structure. Economic Research
Journal (China) (05), 52–63.
Sun, Zheng, Wang, Yaotang, 1999. A positive study on disposing the resources and controlling the surplus. Journal of Finance and Economics (China) (04), 3–
11.
Wang, Yaping, Wu, Liansheng, Bai, Yunxia, 2005. Frequency and magnitude of earnings management of listed companies in China. Economic Research
Journal (China) (12), 102–112.
Wang, Yaotang, Chen, Shimin, 2001. An empirical research of disafﬁliation program’s impact on auditor independence. Audit Research (China) (03), 2–9.
Wang, Yaotang, Tu, Jianming, 2006. Economic consequence of the revision on audit report standard: empirical evidence from capital market. Journal of
Finance and Economics (China) (12), 75–86.
Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall.
Wu, Wenfeng, Wu, Chongfeng, Liu, Xiaowei, 2008. Political connection and market valuation: evidence from China individual-controlled listed ﬁrms.
Economic Research Journal (China) (07), 130–141.
Wu, Wenfeng, Wu, Chongfeng, Rui, Meng, 2009. Government context of Chinese listed companies’ managers and tax preference. Management World
(China) (03), 134–142.
Xia, Lijun, Fang, Yiqiang, 2005. Government control, institutional environment and ﬁrm value: evidence from the Chinese securities market. Economic
Research Journal (China) (05), 40–51.
Xu, Liping, Xin, Yu, Chen, Gongmeng, 2006. Ownership concentration, outside blockholders, and operating performance: evidence from China’s listed
companies. Economic Research Journal (China) (01), 90–100.
154 Z. Lin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 135–154Yu, Minggui, Pan, Hongbo, 2008. The relationship between politics, institutional environments and private enterprises’ access to bank loans. Management
World (China) (08), 9–21.
Yue, Heng, 2006. Large shareholder tunneling and the monitoring role of auditor. China Accounting Review (China) (01), 59–68.
Zhu, Hongjun, He, Xianjie, Chen, Xinyuan, 2006. Financial development, soft budget constraint and business investment. Accounting Research (China) (10),
64–71.
